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Abstract 
The application represents the result of an evaluation using risk-based inspection concepts on an active 
steam line from a coal thermal power station. The RBI (Risk Based Inspection) Expert system, called 
iRiS-Thermo  and  purchased  by  ISIM  this  year,  is  used  for  the  evaluation.  A  few  data  about  the 
possibilities of using this system are presented. 
The phases prescribed by the thermal power stations evaluation procedure are presented, too. It starts with 
the first phase for setting-up the application. The system contains two systems of active steam lines, each 
of them with 72 components. Then comes the data acquisition and validation. The risk analysis procedure 
is made in 3 phases (intermediary, advanced or detailed classification). For each analysis phase the risk 
matrix is set, relieving on one hand the compliance and on the other hand the rejection consequences.   
For the analysis  by  classification only projecting, fabrication and activation data are considered. For 
intermediary  analysis  the  treatment  with  metallographic  damaging  parameter  A  is  considered.  For 
detailed analysis are considered the experimental results obtained by the authors at creep, in order to 
determine the creep-fatigue cumulating.  
Conclusively, it is relieved that the application of this new approaching method, modern with the help of 
a dedicated expert system, allows safely pipe usage, bringing the residual lifetime extension over the 
projected one and obtaining very important economical consequences by the reduction of inspection and 
maintenance costs.  
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The  quality  of  evaluation  services  for  conformity,  inspection  and  risk-based  [1,2] 
maintenance can be controlled by:  
·  quality system processes;  
·  operational processes;  
·  legal responsibility insurance principles.  
Because most of the industrial units have already implemented an accredited quality 
management  system  that  works  good,  this  project  is  mainly  oriented  on  the 
implementation of a management for equipments safety in operation, inspection and 
maintenance  and  most  of  all,  for  damage  monitoring  (cracks  presence  and  size, 
mechanical  material  characteristics  exhaustion  at  operating  with  high  pressure  and 
temperatures) according to the latest worldwide researches for this field. [3,4]. 
This  last  aspect  of  damage  evaluation  (defects  tree  and  events  tress)  represents  the 
missing  link  from  the  quality  management  system  that  is  not  present  at  industrial 
partners. 
 
The evaluation of exploited components accordance, with specifications and referenced 
documents represents a component of a quality management system referring to product 
security [5]. 
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The obtained results after the installation evaluation that was made during exploitation 
contributes to projecting new product inspection and maintenance plans, with benefic 
effects on safety in operation of installations components that work under high pressure 
and temperature, with [6] or without cracks.  
 
ISIM  Timisoara  took  part  to  RIMAP  NAS  (Project  GROWTH  GRD1-2000-25852 
RIMAP) European Project between 2003 -2005, having the  scope of  improving the 
current  practice  of  inspection  and  maintenance  in  European  Industry,  as  well  as  its 
European introduction in taking Risk based decisions.  
 
The RIMAP NAS network’s first target had the main target of providing a platform for 
all the partners from the New European Union Allied Countries [1,2]. 
 
In concordance to the thermo-energetic installations security it can be noticed that each 
activity cost, and we have to ask the following questions:  
-  What do we control? 
-  How much we control? 
-  With what we control? 
-  When we control? 
-  How much does it cost? 
 
The solution for saving money asserts the following: 
-  To reduce operating and injury costs 
-  To have a clear conception about inspection and maintenance planning 
-  A solution consists in inspection and maintenance based on risk evaluation 
 
The risk is defined as: 
RISK = PoF x CoF 
where PoF = assignation probability; CoF = assignation consequences 
 
 
Figure 1. Critical components identification 3 
The problem is how can we identify the critical components? From fig.1 it is noticed 
that  20%  of  the  installation  components  provide  80%  of  total  risk  and  80%  of 
components only 20% of total risk. This is why high and very high risk components 
inspection optimization is needed, with saving money by the reduction of inspection 
level at the last category. In order to control the risk it has to be defined, identified, 
quantified, controlled, minimized etc. 
 
An  expert  system  (iRiS-Power)  [7]  was  bought  by  ISIM.  It  can  resolve  complex 
problems  for  high  pressure  and  temperature  installations,  starting  with  projecting 
calculus  (according  to  code  ASME,  TRD),  monitoring  and  evaluation  of  residual 
lifetime according to the following parameters:    
·  A  parameter;  ·  creep  cavity  density;  ·  crack  dating  (and  monitoring);  ·  residual 
lifetime  calculus;  ·  hardness  measurements;  ·  advanced  evaluation  trace;  ·  crack 
evaluation;  ·  deformation  calculus;  micro-structural  evaluation  based  on  replies;  · 
material evaluation; · creep evaluation; · fatigue evaluation; · yield risk evaluation; ·  
case studies regarding exploitation history; · diagnosis, maintenance and rehabilitation  
aspects.  
 
2.  ISIM Application 
 
The  paper  has  the  scope  of  evaluation  by  applying  Risk-based  Inspection  concepts 
(RBI) to circuits of live steam pipes that connect helping bar to TA4 turbo-aggregate, 
respectively  4RA10 pipes situated between T-pieces (that connect 4RA12 to 4RA10 
pipes from ROMAG TERMO branch of RAAN Drobeta Turnu Severin [8]). 
 
The steps followed in this paper track RIMAP process for thermal power stations [9] 
from the Risk Based Inspection (RBI) manual:  
1)  Application assignation. 
2)  Developing preparatory analysis, data gathering and validation. 
3)  Multilevel Risk Analysis (intermediate and detailed classification); 
4)  Decision  taking  and  operating,  monitoring,  inspection  and  maintenance 
optimization; at this level the inspection plans for high and very high risk 
objects are made. 
5)  Efficiency evaluation after inspection plans implementation. 
 
2.1. Developing preparatory analysis, data gathering and validation 
 
2.1.1Preparatory analysis 
 
Figure  2  shows  the  block  scheme  for  developing  Risk  Based  Inspection  tasks 
according to the manual and to the process from the 2
nd step of this project. .The 1
st 
step is represented by the Preparatory analysis. It is the first project phase and has 
the target of bringing us to the point where the process actually starts. This means 
the  after  this  step’s  finalization  we  should  know  where  the  process  takes  place 4 
(installation, system, components etc), what we want to accomplish (objectives and 
analysis scope) and a general idea about how it is done. 
 
This  step’s  output  is  a  system/component  hierarchy,  in  other  words,  system 
decomposition  in  its subsystems (systems, components, places, pieces). Based on 
this  hierarchy,  the  relevant  risks  can  be  identified,  the  degradation  mechanisms, 
assignation scripts etc (phases of preparatory analysis). This step’s output (system 
limits, analysis target, regulation tasks etc) determine each next phase. 
 
 
Figure 2. Scheme for Risk Based inspection. Marking the 1
st evaluation step: 
Preparatory analysis [10]. 
 
The live stream circuit RA10 is presented in figure 3. The thermal circuit is made by 
straight pipes with welds, bends (at 30º, 60º, 90º) tees etc. They compound a coherent 
system having the target of assuring the thermal agent motion (generator copper) at the 
electrical energy generator tool (turbine or electrical turbo-generator) at high pressure 
and projected temperatures. The straight pipe dimensions are Φ 273 x 38 mm.  
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The  damaging  mechanisms  that  appear  while  these  components  are  used  are  the 
following: 
  ● creep; 
  ● fatigue; 
  ● corrosion and/or   erosion; 
 
At basic materials these damages are located especially in bends, wrought components, 
reductions  and  generally  in  every  component  that  present  tension  geometrical 
concentration.  Accordingly  in  these  areas  the  creep  degradation  will  be  more 
accentuated then in areas with straight section and so the creep exhaustion is consumed 
especially in critical areas, mentioned before. The axial welded parts are very affected 
by creep damaging due to the possibility of appearing macroscopic and microscopic 
welding defects and to the (circumferential) membrane tension that tends to open the 
pipe on the welding part.  
Figure 2.  Live steam circuit RA10 (P1). 6 
Table1. Chemical composition of thermo/resistant steel 12CrMoV3 
 
Chemical composition [%]  Steel brand 
C  Mn  Si  Cr  Mo  P  S  Al  V 
12CrMoV3 
STAS 8184 
0,08 
… 
0,15 
0,40 
… 
0,70 
0,17
… 
0,37 
0,90
… 
1,20 
0,25
… 
0,25 
max. 
0,030 
max. 
0,030 
0,015
… 
0,045 
0,15… 
0,30 
12CrMoV3 
DIN 17175 
0,08 
… 
0,15 
0,40 
… 
0,70 
0,10
… 
0,35 
min. 
0,60 
max. 
0,70 
max. 
0,035 
max. 
0,035 
-  0,22… 
0,32 
 
The steel used in the evaluated pipe system is 12CrMoV3, according to. STAS 8184-87 
(DIN 17175). It is used in building thermo-energetic components that work under high 
pressure at temperatures between 520º…560ºC, as shells and welded tubular fascicles, 
collectors, live steam pipes etc. at temperatures above 560ºC when oxidation resistance 
is  low. In table 1 the chemical composition of  thermo-resistant steel 12CrMoV3 on 
liquid metal tests is presented. 
 
Creep mechanical characteristics values are presented in table 2 (after DIN 17175). 
STAS  8184-87  norm  only  shows  long-term  technical  resistance  values  in  the 
temperature range between 520º…580ºC. 
 
Table 2. Creep mechanical characteristics values depending on thermo-resistant 
steel working temperature 12CrMoV3 
 
Creep technical limit 
[N/mm
2] 
Technical timing 
resistance [N/mm
2] 
Steel brand  Temp. 
[ºC] 
R1/10.000  R1/100.000  R1/10.000  R1/100.000 
480  243  177  299  218 
490  219  155  268  191 
500  195  138  241  170 
510  178  122  219  150 
520  161  107  198  131 
530  146  94  179  116 
540  133  81  164  100 
550  120  69  148  85 
560  109  59  134  72 
570  (98)  (48)  (121)  (59) 
 
 
 
 
12CrMoV3 
(STAS 8184-87) 
580  (88)  (37)  (108)  (46) 7 
Table 3. Analyzed elements (installation register RA10, only the first two pipes and 
the first elbow). 
 
No. 
 
Component 
name 
Ins. 
Diam.  
/ 
DX 
[mm] 
Proj. 
Wall 
thickne
ss.  
[mm] 
Material 
(steel) 
/ 
weight. Rigid  
[daN] 
Press. 
[bar] 
Temp 
[ºC] 
Const/nod 
Bending 
angle 
[º] 
Admis. 
Sress. 
 
σc/σh1 
[N/mm
2] 
1.  Pipe  
(300-610) – 
4RA10-14 / - 
273,00 
/ 
335,00 
38,00  12CrMoV3 
(STAS  8184 
-87) / - 
152,00  530  610 ANC  120/70 
2.  Pipe  
(610-620) / - 
273,00 
/ 
475,00 
38,00  12CrMoV3 
(STAS8184 -
87) / - 
152,00  530    120/70 
…                 
12.  Elbow 
(1550-1560) – 
Cot 1 / -  
/ DX = 1.515 
273,00 
 
38,00  12CrMoV3 
(STAS 8184-
87) / - 
152,00  530  1.350 
/ 90º 
120/70 
 
This phase’s output is a system/component hierarchy, a decomposition of the presented 
system into subsystems (systems, components, pieces, places). Both pipe systems are 
decomposed in the objects presented in table 3 for RA10 trace. This table also presents 
projecting data (type, component, dimension, temperature, pressure, constraints, angle, 
radius and bending angle etc). 
 
The considered system definition/limits [10]: 
-  64 components for 4RA10 system; 
-  Main damaging mechanisms: fatigue (creep); 
-  Main assignation scenario: drain, crushing; 
-  Selected time for risk analysis for the considered systems is 200.000 hours 
operating (15 years). 
 
Work was done by a team that included: 
-  Installation supervision engineer; 
-  Installation operating engineers; 
-  Installation maintenance engineers; 
 
Based  on  this  hierarchy,  relevant  risk,  damaging  mechanisms,  assignation  scenarios 
(sub-steps of the preparatory analysis) can be identified. This phase’s output (system 
limits, analysis target, damaging mechanisms) determine each next phase. 
 
2.1.2. Data collecting and validation 
 
Figure 3 presents the block scheme for the risk based inspection work development, 
according to the manual and to the process from the 2
nd phase of this project. This step 8 
target is relevant data and necessary information gathering and organizing. Data are 
used  both  for  risk  probability  evaluation  and  for  getting  assignment  scenario 
consequences using analysis methods that respect RIMAP process generic requirements.  
 
 
Figure 3. Scheme for risk Based inspection. Marking the 2
nd RBI evaluation step. Data 
gathering and validation. 
 
Depending to analysis level, data quantity and quality varies. When data are rare or less 
qualitative, the risk evaluation associated incertitude will be higher. 
 
This step’s output is collected and verified: 
-  Data according to the project, fabrication and construction; 
-  History of operation and equipment; 
-  Generic/ equivalent data. 
For general information about the examined installation are introduced data regarding 
the live steam pipes group belonging to steam caldron from RAAN-TERMO Drobeta 
Tr.  Severin  thermal  power  station.  Because  after  87.910  hours  of  working  the  pipe 
suffered a creep break on one bend, in the classification phase the assignation risk is 
considered very high. The working temperature is 540ºC and the pressure is 152 bar. 
The lifetime at the moment of analysis is de 87.910 hours, while the projected lifetime 9 
is 87.000 ore, so that the system in the phase of RBI Classification analysis will relieve 
creep exhaustion, so a very high creeping risk. 
 
Data were stored in a logical database. It will not only facilitate the evaluation process, 
but the actualization and  inspection process too, which are an essential part of RBI 
process. 
 
Collected data for this application: 
-  Component geometry data (- interior diameter, - wall thickness, - projected 
wall thickness; - …); 
-  Projecting temperature and pressure; 
-  Material data: creep breaking medium resistance for component’s material and 
fatigue resistance for given temperature. 
-  Component service time – operating hours; 
-  Data from the monitoring system (ex. Pressure, temperature); 
-  Testing data (NDT, etc.), including records of precedent inspection, 
-  Preliminary calculus data (ex. TRD „German technical rules for cauldrons”). 
 
For  obtaining  creeping  consequences  (CoF),  which  was  considered  only  from  the 
economically point of view in this application, for each component the following data 
were gained: 
-  Replacing cost (acquisition cost/budget); 
-  Additional replacing cost; 
-  Production cost loss (number of days without production x cost per day).   
 
2.1.3. Multilevel risk analysis 
 
Multilevel risk analysis was developed according to figure 4. This step has the target of 
identifying  relevant  risks  for  each  system  between  working  limits  and  to  determine 
creeping  probabilities  and  consequences  for  many  levels  (in  detail)  for  the  above 
analysis. The scope of the multilevel approach is to give priority to work by reducing 
the effort needed for low-risk objects and growing the effort for high-risk ones. 
 
This step’s output is a value or a category PoF and CoF for the considered equipment 
part.  Based  on  PoF  and  CoF,  the  risk  evaluation  results  can  be  graphical  traced  in 
different  matrix  for  every  risk  type  (risk  map  for  safety,  health,  environment  and 
economic risks). The risk results should be compared with other related studies and 
safety cases. 
 
The  creeping  scenario  for  components  analyses  two  RA10  system  components:  - 
straight  pipe  segment  P1;  and  bend  C1.  The  block  scheme  for  scenario  analysis  of 
components creeping  is presented  in  figure 5. After developing the risk analysis  by 
classification it is noticed that because of the finalization of projected lifetime the two 
components are situated in the high risk area (due to high creeping probability). The risk 
matrix obtained after classification risk analysis is presented in figure 6. 
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Figure 4. Multilevel risk analysis 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The assignation scenario for components considering creep and fatigue 
mechanism both for PoF and CoF. 11 
 
 
Figure 6.Risk matrix after classification analysis. 
 
For analysis, if the components still relieve life reserve after increasing inspection level, 
it is made a detailed analysis.  
 
Detailed analysis included: 
-  tensile calculus for worst cases; 
-  creep analysis; 
-  fatigue analysis; 
-  NDT detailed analysis. 
The component position through different analysis levels:  
-  PoF calculus by classification based on nominal operating data; 
-  PoF calculus by intermediary analysis based on real operating data (rose from 
the monitoring system); 
-  PoF calculus by detailed analysis based on NDT reliability analysis after no 
significant  defects  were  found  and  based  on  probability  analysis  and 
mechanical high temperature rupture.  
Using  iRiS-Creep  and  iRiS.Fatigue  modules  (with  extended  generic  databases  for 
analyzed steel) showed that the pipe and the analyzed elbow have a creep exhaustion of 
maximum 63,5% and the creep exhaustion only represents a maximum of 4% (fig. 7.) 12 
   
 
Figure 7. Proving creep and fatigue exhaustion at detailed analysis. 
 
 
Figure 8. Marking creep and fatigue exhaustion on detailed analysis 
 
The risk matrix after making a detailed analysis (fig. 8.) relieves the decrease of risk 
level  in  the  green  area,  with  low  working  risk  due  to  the  reduction  of  assignation 
probability at detailed risk analysis. 
 
3.  Conclusions  
 
In conclusion it is considered that this paper represents the first national approach of the 
risk-based inspection concept by using the iRis-Power expert system that is dedicated to 
this kind of analysis for thermal power station components. The example is applied to 
the RA10 live steam pipes system which includes 64 components. It represented a very 13 
complex application regarding the importance, the high risk and the consequences for 
the security of installation, persons, environment and financial costs. It is concluded that 
from the classification analysis which relieved a very high risk level (marked red in risk 
matrix) to the detailed analysis, the risk was reduced to an acceptable level that allows 
operating (marked green on risk matrix). 
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